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INTRODUCTION
As San Francisco District Attorney, I was elected in late 2019 on an
ambitious platform focused on ending mass incarceration and decreasing
* Thank you to Cristine Soto Deberry, Rachel Marshall, Scott Stillman, and Gena CastroRodriguez for their support in writing this article and to all the staff at the San Francisco
District Attorney’s Office for their help in envisioning and implementing the policies herein.

23

24

BOUDIN

[Vol. 110 Online

racial disparities in the criminal justice system. 1 Little did I imagine that my
first year in office would bring an acute national focus to the exact issues on
which I had campaigned.
Two phenomena have, thus far, largely defined the year 2020. First, the
COVID-19 pandemic, which continues to have a grossly disparate impact on
communities of color 2 and on those living and working in prisons and jails. 3
Second, a national Black Lives Matter movement grew in response to the
murder of George Floyd—potentially the largest national movement in U.S.
history—demanding police accountability and criminal justice reform with a
focus on racial equity. 4 The nation’s collective response to these
developments—how the country navigates an unprecedented national health
crisis and an unprecedented protest movement—will have lasting
implications for myriad aspects of American life, including the criminal
justice system.
COVID-19 and the growth of the Black Lives Matter movement created
a tremendous impetus for wide-ranging criminal justice reform, including
decarceration and police accountability. 5 Although some criminal justice
jurisdictions have actively resisted change, 6 and others have simply been

1
Tim Arango, Dad’s in Prison, Mom Was on Parole. Their Son is Now Running for D.A.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/chesa-boudin-sanfrancisco-da.html [https://perma.cc/72J9-V9N5].
2
Health Equity Considerations and Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, CENTER FOR
DISEASE CONTROL (July 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/racial-ethnic-minorities.html [https://perma.cc/6AUS-MSKU].
3
Eric Reinhart & Daniel Chen, Incarceration and its Disseminations: COVID-19 Lessons
from Chicago’s Cook County Jail, 39 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1412 (2020) (exploring the role of jails
and prisons in the spread of COVID-19).
4
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui, & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/i
nteractive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/VGS5-AZ
YW]; see generally BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/ [https://perma.cc/V
J3B-AR3W].
5
Deanna Van Buren & F. Javier Torres-Campos, Mass Decarceration, COVID-19, and
Justice in America, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (June 9, 2020), https://ssir.org/articles/e
ntry/mass_decarceration_and_covid_19 [https://perma.cc/JL69-Y3B3]; Mary Blankenship &
Richard v. Reeves, From the George Floyd Moment to a Black Lives Matter Movement, in
Tweets, BROOKINGS (July 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/07/10/fro
m-the-george-floyd-moment-to-a-black-lives-matter-movement-in-tweets/
[https://perma.cc/B9NQ-P42D].
6
Editorial Bd., Editorial: No, Criminals Aren’t Rampaging Across California Because of
Our Zero-Dollar Bail Policy, L.A. TIMES (May 27, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
opinion/story/2020-05-27/la-ed-zero-bail-lies-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/K4JC-DP96].
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unprepared for it, 7 San Francisco was ready. After all, San Francisco voters
had just elected me on explicit promises to deliver many of the reforms now
in the national spotlight, and we were changemaking even before the first
case of COVID was diagnosed in the United States. 8
Even before my election, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office
(“SFDAO”) was already ahead of the criminal justice reform curve nationally
by most any metric. Since 1991, none of my three elected predecessors had
chosen to seek the death penalty. 9 In 2005, then-District Attorney Kamala
Harris launched the “Back on Track” program as an alternative to the war on
drugs. 10 Former District Attorney George Gascón advanced decarceration
through state legislative reforms 11 and initiated a series of “collaborative
courts” and restorative justice programs as alternatives to traditional criminal
prosecution. 12 Well before George Floyd was killed, San Francisco leaders
had implemented a wide range of police reforms, which included and went
even further than the “8 Can’t Wait.” 13 These reforms, and many, many more
contributed to San Francisco having an incarceration rate less than half that

7
Courts’ Responses to the Covid-19 Crisis, BRENNAN CENT. FOR JUST. (September 10,
2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/courts-responses-covid-19crisis [https://perma.cc/P8TF-CPTY].
8
Evan Sernoffsky, Chesa Boudin, Reformer Public Defender, Wins Election as San
Francisco’s New DA, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 9, 2019, 5:54 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ba
yarea/article/Chesa-Boudin-reformer-public-defender-wins-14823166.php
[https://perma.cc/A27P-CK64].
9
Romy Ganschow, Death by Geography: A County by County Analysis of the Road to
Execution in California, ACLU OF N. CAL., https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/deat
h_by_geography.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4JM-4UZW].
10
Jacquelyn L. Rivers & Lenore Anderson, Back on Track: A Problem-solving Reentry
Court, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE (Sept. 2009), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyc
kuh186/files/Publications/BackonTrackFS.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GWN-X4LE].
11
George Gascón, Prop. 47 is Necessary to Put War on Drugs Behind Us, S.F. CHRON.
(Nov. 24, 2018, 6:52 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/Prop-47-is-necessary
-to-put-the-war-on-drugs-13413035.php [https://perma.cc/9UYV-BJUQ].
12
Katherine Weinstein Miller, Changing the Life Trajectory of Justice-involved Young
Adults in San Francisco, HARV. KENNEDY SCHOOL MALCOM WEINER CENT. FOR SOC. POL’Y,
https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/wiener/programs/criminaljustice/researchpublications/young-adult-justice/developments-in-young-adult-justice/changing-the-lifetrajectory-of-justice-involved-young-adults-in-san-francisco
[https://perma.cc/BL7AGRM4].
13
See generally Matthew Yglesias, 8 Can’t Wait, Explained, VOX (June 5, 2020, 4:00
PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/5/21280402/8-cant-wait-explained-policing-reforms [h
ttps://perma.cc/L3MS-K7A6]; Alex Shultz, DeRay McKesson on the 8 Reforms That Could
Dramatically Reduce Police Violence, GQ (June 3, 2020), https://www.gq.com/story/deraymckesson-interview-8-cant-wait [https://perma.cc/6RUR-3E5B].
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of the rest of California before I took office. 14 And yet these reforms were
not nearly enough to undo the failings of past criminal justice policies; they
were not enough to build trust between impacted communities and law
enforcement. The tensions, shortcomings, and distrust that the Black Lives
Matter movement brought to national focus will not be resolved through
catchy slogans, social media campaigns, quick fixes, or singular policies. The
point, here, is not to analyze the history of reforms in San Francisco but rather
to make explicit that there is still much work ahead in undoing the complex
systems of oppression and racism baked into the criminal justice system.
This Essay focuses on policies implemented in one local jurisdiction,
specifically one District Attorney’s office, in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic and the Black Lives Matter movement during the first several
months in office of a newly elected District Attorney: me. In some ways,
what follows is San Francisco-centric. Yet most of the policies and initiatives
described below serve as examples of new ways to approach common
challenges for virtually any law-enforcement jurisdiction in the country, most
of which are dealing with similar challenges exacerbated by COVID-19 and
highlighted by the racial justice movement.
An as yet unwritten part is the still unfolding historical context: the
impact of COVID-19 on criminal courts, jails, and prisons, and the ongoing
story of how Black Lives Matter went from being an isolated social
movement to mainstream cause celebre. 15 Rather than self-consciously
seeking to write a first draft of a history that is very much still in the present,
this Essay focuses on the challenges of the moment and SFDAO’s responses.
A few years from now historians will have more perspective on the lasting
impacts of these phenomena on the criminal justice system. But
policymakers cannot afford to wait until a crisis has passed to formulate
responses; instead we must be dynamic, make calculated risks, and hope that
our ideas, vision, and political will are adequate to meet the challenges of the
moment.
Parts I, II, and III, respectively set out in detail many of the more than a
dozen wide-ranging policy initiatives 16 SFDAO has implemented since I
took the helm in January 2020 and the rationale underlying the policies.
14
James Austin, Eliminating Mass Incarceration: How San Francisco Did It, JFA INST.
(Nov. 2015), http://www.jfa-associates.com/publications/reduce/Reforming%20San%20Fr
anciscos%20Criminal%20Justice%20System-JA4.pdf [https://perma.cc/QR9V-ZTC8].
15
Nate Cohn & Kevin Quealy, How Public Opinion Has Moved on Black Lives Matter,
N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/10/upshot/blacklives-matter-attitudes.html [https://perma.cc/HG2R-M3H8].
16
The policies and initiatives described below are not an exhaustive list of significant
work conducted during this period.
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These policies are organized into three parts: victim support; decarceration
to improve public safety; and police and prosecutor accountability. Taken
together, these policies are part of an effort to transform SFDAO from an
office narrowly focused on litigating cases with the goal of securing criminal
convictions into a broader stakeholder investing in building public safety,
healing the harm that crime causes, and honoring the dignity and rights of all
those whose lives are impacted by the criminal justice system.
Before launching into these specific policy analyses, it bears mentioning
that SFDAO aims to implement humane, community-informed, and datadriven policies. SFDAO has nearly a dozen research partnerships 17 to help
track outcomes and trouble-shoot implementations as well as to generate new
policy ideas. Meaningful data take time to collect and analyze. SFDAO aims
to continue to improve its policies in response to empirical data. What
follows is just a beginning: new policies which do not yet have enough of a
track record to be analyzed critically for their empirical impact, successes, or
shortcomings over time. SFDAO is committed to continually and
transparently evaluating all policies and finding ways to improve.
I. SAN FRANCISCO DISTRICT ATTORNEY 2020 POLICY INITIATIVES: VICTIM
SUPPORT
Many prosecutors have traditionally conflated their advocacy for
victims with seeking convictions and draconian punishments. 18 Yet police
cannot always make arrests in every crime, and District Attorneys cannot
always secure convictions in those cases where police make arrests. 19 District
Attorneys can, however, do far more to recognize and support victims of
crime, especially violent crime. Over $80 billion of the $182 billion spent
annually on criminal justice goes to incarceration. 20 Far too little is invested
17

These partnerships include: UC Berkeley’s California Policy Lab, University of San
Francisco, Hatchuel Tabernik & Associates, CSU Longbeach, Justice Research & Statistics
Association, Measures for Justice, RAND, UC Irvine, CUNY-Institute for State and Local
Governance, American Institutes of Research, and Stanford University (Computational Policy
Lab).
18
EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN
PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 168 (2019); see also F.T. Green, The Victims’
Rights Movement Helps Prosecutors, Not Victims, THE OUTLINE (June 10, 2019, 12:32 PM),
https://theoutline.com/post/7547/victims-rights-movement?zd=1&zi=nwzdoqev.
[https://perma.cc/BER9-A3PN].
19
Nor would it be in the interests of justice to seek convictions in every possible case.
20
Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money of Mass Incarceration,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html
[https://perma.cc/GL69-A2SU]; The 2019-20 Budget: California Spending Plan Judiciary
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in supporting and healing victims of crime. 21 Many victims feel re-victimized
by the criminal justice process, 22 reporting that they are treated more like
pieces of evidence than human beings who have been hurt. 23 In some
situations, victims are even jailed under material witness statutes by
prosecutors focused more on using victims to secure convictions than on
hearing or supporting them. 24
Only a trivial percentage of most District Attorneys’ budgets is
dedicated to victim services. 25 Yet victim support remains a priority for
SFDAO and the office has found numerous ways to expand support for crime
victims, specifically in the context of COVID-19 and Black Lives Matter.
This Part presents examples of early 2020 initiatives, including: (1)
compensating victims of police violence; (2) expanding emergency support

and Criminal Justice, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Oct. 17, 2019), https://lao.ca.gov/
Publications/Report/4097#:~:text
=The%202019%2D20%20budget%20provides,19%20General%20Fund%20spending%20le
vel [https://perma.cc/8PYY-E9Q3].
21
See Types of Funding, OFF. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME: FUNDING & AWARDS (April 23,
2020),
https://ovc.ojp.gov/funding/types-of-funding
[https://perma.cc/M3YP-X27B]
(detailing the federal Office for Victims of Crime funding); Victim Services in California: A
Recommendation for Combining the State’s Victims’ Programs, CAL. VICTIM COMPENSATION
BD. (Oct. 2018), https://victims.ca.gov/reports/consolidationreport2019/FinalConsolidation
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LNL-3RUM] (detailing the California Victim Compensation
Board’s funding); OVC Formula Chart: 2019 Crime Victims Fund Allocation, OFFICE FOR
VICTIMS OF CRIME, https://ovc.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh226/files/media/document/crimevictims-fund-compensation-allocations-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U37V-FQ2F].
22
Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 81 (2020) (detailing ways in
which criminal courts contribute to retraumatizing victims of violent crime).
23
See Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights? The Nature of the Opposition
to Pro-victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 157, 158 (1992)
(summarizing history of victim rights movement and lack of legal standing victims had at least
until the 1970s). For an international example, see Rape Victims are Treated ‘Like a Piece of
Evidence’, DAILY MAIL (May 25, 2011, 9:51 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1390724/Rape-victims-treated-like-piece-evidence--Woman-clashed-Ken-Clarke-revealsdetails-secret-meeting.html [https://perma.cc/NCY9-8WJ8].
24
Emily Lane, Victims Jailed in New Orleans for Refusing to Testify, Watchdog Group
Says, NOLA (Apr. 11, 2017, 10:18 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/artic
le_518fe6ad-37cd-590f-b440-4d86ad9eab15.html
[https://perma.cc/5BZE-DJUX];
see
generally Preston Burton, Paige Ammons, & Caroline Eisner, Coercive Process for Material
Witnesses Needs Reform, LAW360 (Mar. 24, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/article
s/1140264/coercive-process-for-material-witnesses-needs-reform [https://perma.cc/5YFBYE6D].
25
Victim Services Budget as a percent of the total General Fund Contribution for fiscal
year 2019-2020: $2,220,918 as a percent of $65,467,956 = 3.39 percent.
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for victims of domestic violence; and (3) launching a unit focused on
economic crimes against workers. 26
A. COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS AND WITNESSES OF POLICE
VIOLENCE

Events, including the shooting of Jacob Blake, and the killings of
Breonna Taylor, Tony McDade, and George Floyd, remind us that additional
safeguards are needed to protect victims of police violence. Victims and
witnesses who are injured, killed, or traumatized by police are not legally
considered victims of crime until and unless the offending officer is charged
with a crime. Under California law, if an officer is not charged, victims and
witnesses of that officer’s violence do not qualify for California Victims of
Crime Compensation. California Government Code section 13956 allows
victims to be excluded from accessing state-level crime victims’
compensation if they are assumed to have contributed to their
victimization—something officers have a vested interest in suggesting.
Indeed, the Code requires that their victimization status is determined and
certified by the very law enforcement agencies that may be responsible for
the harm, making it nearly impossible to qualify for resources like medical,
mental health, funeral and burial, and relocations resources. Victims of
excessive force and police violence and those who love them need financial
resources and support to recover and heal from the violence, just like any
other victims of violence do.
SFDAO announced victim of crime compensation from SFDAO Victim
Services Division local funds to provide to victims of police violence,
witnesses of police violence, loved ones of police violence victims, and
protestors injured by police. 27 The compensation offered includes funeral and
burial assistance, medical and mental health bills, relocation support and
crime scene clean up where appropriate.
These victim services and support resources are available on a case-bycase basis and do not require that police reports list the individual as a
“victim” or that SFDAO criminally prosecutes the officers. The policy also
26

This is not an exhaustive list of the Victim Services Division’s award-winning work,
much of which is grant funded to fill the gap in needed services and what County is willing to
support. For more, see Dr. Gena Castro Rodriguez, End of Year Report 2019, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y:
VICTIM SERV’S DIV. (2019), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/VSDEnd-of-Year-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5YU-TA88].
27
Press Release, S.F. Dist. Att’y, District Attorney Boudin Announces Expansion of
Services, Including Victim Compensation, to Victims and Witnesses of Police Violence, (June
9, 2020), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/article/district-attorney-boudin-announces-expansionservices-including-victim-compensation-victims [https://perma.cc/QM7B-WNZT].
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includes a partnership with University of California San Francisco’s Trauma
Recovery Center to refer victims in need of professional support services on
a pro bono basis. SFDAO is stepping in to do what the state of California
Victim Compensation Board would otherwise do. SFDAO is also actively
working to encourage other jurisdictions in California to follow suit and to
change the state law that creates this gap in services. 28 This initiative is more
than just SFDAO temporarily filling a void. It is a significant practical and
symbolic step in fulfilling SFDAO’s vision of its role as more than just a law
enforcement agency that incidentally provides for victim healing by locking
up perpetrators. SFDAO strives to be an organization that promotes
community safety, justice, and healing for victims regardless of the litigation
status of the person who harmed them.
B. EMERGENCY SUPPORT FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 29
Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, it seemed that intimate partner
violence, child abuse and other domestic violence crimes were on the rise 30
but less likely to be reported. 31 Shelter-in-place orders meant that vulnerable
victims of abuse in the home were required to remain at home with their
abusers. During the first week after the shelter-in-place directive SFDAO
saw a sixty percent increase in client referrals to the Victim Services
Division, compared to the same week in 2019. The following week brought
a thirty-three percent decrease in new client referrals, also compared to
2019. 32 From March 17, 2020 when shelter-in-place began in San Francisco
through June 30, 2020, there was a significant decrease in new domestic
28

On July 8, 2020, California Assembly Member Sydney Kamlager introduced legislation
tracking these San Francisco Policy changes but it did not become law. S. 329, 2019-2020
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=
201920200AB329 [https://perma.cc/MD4R-TFXV].
29
This section draws on work done by Gena Castro-Rodriguez and Paige Allmendinge in
the Victim Services Division.
30
Amanda Taub, A New Covid-19 Crisis: Domestic Abuse Rises Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/world/coronavirus-domestic-violence.
html [https://perma.cc/VK7S-ERU7].
31
Nina Agrawal, The Coronavirus Could Cause a Child Abuse Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/opinion/coronavirus-child-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/3NHE-3E3K].
32
Gena Rodriguez & Paige Allmendinger, S.F. DIST. ATTY: VICTIM SERVS DIV.,
Heightened Domestic Violence Threat in the Time of COVID-19, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y: VICTIM
SERV’S DIV (April 20, 2020), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/victim-services/heightened-domest
ic-violence-threat-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/G2Y7-XRFL]. SFDAO continues to monitor
these trends to ensure appropriate distribution of resources and ultimately identify if there is a
causal relationship between the shelter-in-place directive and referrals to the Victim Services
Division.
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violence referrals both as an absolute number and as a percentage of total
victim referrals when compared with the same period in 2019 or 2018. While
the data on referral volume paint a seemingly counter-intuitive picture, there
are reasons to believe, based on the nature of the crime and our current
circumstances, that domestic violence is on the rise during the pandemic. 33
COVID-19 raises threats of domestic violence and child abuse, while
simultaneously erecting greater barriers for victims to reach out for help. 34
To better support domestic violence victims, and to help prevent future
violence, SFDAO arranged emergency housing for those in need of refuge.
Working with other city agencies and through private partnerships, SFDAO
secured a range of housing options and made them available at no cost to
domestic violence victims and their dependents. In partnership with San
Francisco Mayor London Breed and Veritas Investments, a San Franciscobased real estate investment company, SFDAO secured 20 furnished
apartments for temporary use by domestic violence victims. 35 The project
was later expanded to include hotel rooms for shorter-term emergency use
by domestic violence victims; a partnership to provide housing through
Airbnb; 36 and a partnership with Lyft to provide free transportation vouchers
to victims. 37
Many of the people who received benefits from these partnerships could
not afford to wait for a criminal case to run its course. Some of them may not
have wanted or even benefited from formal criminal justice system
involvement but still needed support; SFDAO provided services regardless
of whether these victims were connected to a criminal case. SFDAO strongly
believes these services should not be tied to the existence of charges, nor
depend on a victim’s participation in criminal prosecution when charges are
filed. These emergency services for vulnerable victims can save lives,

33

Taub, supra note 30.
Agrawal, supra note 31.
35
Press Release, S.F. Dist. Att’y, District Attorney Boudin Teams Up with Mayor Breed
to Announce Temporary Housing for Survivors of Domestic Violence (Apr. 9, 2020), https://
sfdistrictattorney.org/press-release/da-boudin-announces-temporary-housing-for-survivorsof-dv/ [https://perma.cc/4DME-8QHF]; San Francisco Secures Housing For Domestic
Violence Survivors During Coronavirus Shelter-In-Place, CBS S.F. BAY AREA (Apr. 9, 2020,
2:32 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/04/09/sf-housing-domestic-violence-surv
ivors-coronavirus-shelter-in-place/ [https://perma.cc/3TZ2-PAYY].
36
Supporting Domestic Violence Survivors in California, AIRBNB (May 29, 2020),
https://news.airbnb.com/supporting-domestic-violence-survivors-in-california/
[https://perma.cc/MR6P-9LKM].
37
District Attorney Partners with Lyft to Help Domestic Violence Victims, S.F. NEWS
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.thesfnews.com/district-attorney-partners-with-lyft-to-help-dom
estic-violence-victims/54702 [https://perma.cc/3YA7-VFB3].
34
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prevent future harm, and empower victims without the delays necessarily
associated with litigation.
C. ECONOMIC CRIMES AGAINST WORKERS 38
The pandemic severely impacted the economy and especially essential
workers. Although prosecutors’ offices are not typically associated with
employment rights and workplace safety, I pledged to enforce laws in this
area to hold employers accountable. This work is needed more than ever
during the pandemic.
SFDAO is committed to protecting workers harmed by economic
crimes and to holding unscrupulous employers accountable. Safeguarding
workers from exploitation is vital to accomplishing the office’s mission to
promote and ensure public safety, as harm to workers causes a multitude of
interconnected and compounding damages throughout society. 39 As the
California Supreme Court underscored, when “minimum employment
standards” are unfulfilled, “the public will often be left to assume the
responsibility of the ill effects to workers and their families resulting from
substandard wages or unhealthy and unsafe working conditions.” 40
The pandemic and Black Lives Matter exposed egregious inequalities
and exploitation in the workplace and illustrate the need for SFDAO’s
enforcement of labor laws. Various frontline workers have been deemed
“essential” to justify putting them in harm’s way, often without providing
appropriate protective equipment, pay raises, or mandated safeguards. 41 Due
38

This section draws on work by Assistant District Attorney Scott Stillman.
The California Constitution authorizes the Legislature to enact laws to protect workers.
See CAL. CONST. art. 14, § 1 (“The Legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the
general welfare of employees”); see also Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc., 31 Cal.
App. 4th 1137, 1148 (1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (“California courts
have long recognized wage and hours laws concern not only the health and welfare of the
workers themselves, but also the public health and general welfare.”); S.G. Borello & Sons,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 48 Cal. 3d 341, 358 (1989) (recognizing that California’s
worker protection laws “have a public purpose beyond the private interests of the workers
themselves. Among other things, the statute represents society’s recognition that if the
financial risk of job injuries is not placed upon the businesses which produce them, it may fall
upon the public treasury”).
40
Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 953 (2018).
41
See Adie Tomer & Joseph W. Kane, To Protect Frontline Workers During and After
COVID-19, We Must Define who They are, BROOKINGS (June 10, 2020), https://www.broo
kings.edu/research/to-protect-frontline-workers-during-and-after-covid-19-we-must-definewho-they-are/ [https://perma.cc/2UVU-RUW8] (describing the need for clearer definitions of
“frontline” and “essential” workers and industries); see also Attorney General Becerra Joins
Coalition Urging Whole Foods and Amazon to Step Up on Worker Protections and Paid Sick
39

2020]

OPPORTUNITY IN CRISIS

33

to historic and systemic racism, many occupations have become segregated,
with Black and Latinx workers disproportionately represented among lowerpaying, frontline positions like cashiers. 42 Further, a study found that only
19.7 percent of Black workers and 16.2 percent of Latinx workers have jobs
that allow them to work from home compared to 37 percent of Asians and
29.9 percent of Whites. 43 This means that workers of color disproportionately
provide our essential services——jobs that put workers in contact with
potentially virus-infected members of the public—and also work in the
highest injury risk positions (even prior to the pandemic), 44 all on top of a
long record of racial disparities in pay, scheduling, and promotions. 45
Leave, OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. (Mar., 25, 2020), https://oag.ca.gov/news/pressreleases/attorney-general-becerra-joins-coalition-urging-whole-foods-and-amazon-step
[https://perma.cc/6HUR-7BTW] (noting that the California Attorney General joined a
coalition of 14 other Attorney Generals across the country to urge Whole Foods and Amazon
to improve worker protections and access to paid sick leave); James J. Brudney, Forsaken
Heroes: COVID-19 and Frontline Essential Workers, FORDHAM URB. L.J. (forthcoming
2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3662434 [https://perma.cc/HB
G7-8PPE] (describing the lack of legal and health protections for many essential workers);
Judge Orders Oakland McDonald’s to Step Up COVID Precautions, CBS S.F. BAY AREA
(Aug. 15, 2020, 8:23 A.M.), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/08/15/judge-orders-oakl
and-mcdonalds-to-step-up-covid-precautions/ [https://perma.cc/2LAE-CJS4] (describing an
Alameda County Superior Court Judge’s issuance of a preliminary injunction against the
owners of a McDonald’s in Oakland, California that required the restaurant to implement
various safety requirements such as providing “adequate and sufficient masks” after a
coronavirus outbreak infected thirty-five people as alleged by workers at the restaurant);
Daniel Schneider & Kristen Harknett, Essential and Unprotected: COVID-19-Related Health
and Safety Procedures for Service-Sector Workers, SHIFT PROJECT (May 2020),
https://shift.berkeley.edu/files/2020/05/Essential-and-Unprotected-COVID-19-HealthSafety.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA4F-NVGL]. Out of approximately 8,000 service-sector
employees who were surveyed between March 7 and April 9, 2020, fewer than 10% reported
access to masks in early March 2020 and that rose to just 40% by early April, and even then,
only a mere 20% reported they were required to wear masks. Id.
42
Catherine Ruetschlin & Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, The Retail Race Divide, DEMOS
(June 2, 2015), https://www.demos.org/research/retail-race-divide-how-retail-industryperpetuating-racial-inequality-21st-century [https://perma.cc/93UG-9GCK]; see also
Campbell Robertson & Robert Gebeloff, How Millions of Women Became the most Essential
Workers in America, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/
us/coronavirus-women-essential-workers.html [https://perma.cc/AF85-WB76].
43
Elise Gould & Heidi Shierholz, Not everybody can Work from Home, ECON. POL’Y INST.
(Mar. 19, 2020 1:15 PM), https://www.epi.org/blog/black-and-hispanic-workers-are-muchless-likely-to-be-able-to-work-from-home/ [https://perma.cc/EC7K-FZ4R] (noting women
are also overrepresented and underpaid in jobs that have been labeled “essential” during the
pandemic).
44
Seth A. Seabury, Sophie Terp, & Leslie I. Boden, Racial and Ethnic Differences in the
Frequency of Workplace Injuries and the Prevalence of Work-Related Disability, NCBI,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6198680/ [https://perma.cc/XKE4-VP64].
45
See Rueschtlin & Asante-Muhammad, supra note 42.
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Discouragingly, when Black workers voice their concerns about potential
spread of coronavirus at work, they face the real threat of retaliation. 46
Because essential workers risk their own health and safety to sustain the rest
of society’s needs during this pandemic, it is paramount that government
entities tasked with enforcing laws prioritize legal protections for these
workers. 47
To that end, SFDAO launched the Economic Crimes Against Workers
Unit (“ECAW”) to investigate and prosecute violations committed by
employers against workers. 48 This innovative unit, one of the first of its kind
in the nation, 49 focuses on crimes such as wage theft, labor trafficking,
criminal immigration-related workplace retaliation, as well as civil
enforcement of California’s Unfair Competition Laws.
ECAW’s first case was an action against DoorDash, Inc., 50 a gig
economy company headquartered in San Francisco which has the nation’s
largest market share in the on-demand food-delivery space. 51 The complaint
alleges that DoorDash illegally misclassifies its delivery workers as
46
Irene Tung & Laura Padin, Silenced About COVID-19 in the Workplace, NAT’L EMPL.
LAW PROJECT, 2 (June 2020), https://www.nelp.org/publication/silenced-covid-19-workplace
[https://perma.cc/CK6P-K7QX] (finding Black workers were more than twice as likely as
white workers to report that they or someone at work may have been retaliated against for
raising concerns about COVID-19 spreading in the workplace).
47
See Chris Benner, On-demand and On-the-Edge: Ride hailing and Delivery workers in
San Francisco, INST. FOR SOC. TRANSFORM., UC SANTA CRUZ, 3 (May 5, 2020),
https://transform.ucsc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OnDemandOntheEdge_ExecSum
.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2YK-TKHJ] (noting a survey showing that 63 percent of San
Francisco platform workers believed “public officials should enforce laws so app-based
workers who are misclassified as independent contractors could have access to
unemployment, paid leave, and other benefits under city and state laws”).
48
Press Release, S.F. Dist. Att’y, District Attorney Launces New Economic Crimes Unit
to Protect Workers’ Rights (Apr. 21, 2020), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/press-release/neweconomic-crimes-unit-to-protect-workers/ [https://perma.cc/YY4P-87JJ].
49
Philadelphia DA Larry Krasner created a Labor Liaison position to prosecute crimes
against workers as part of his office’s Economic Crimes Unit. See Press Release, Phila. Dist.
Att’ys Off., RELEASE: District Attorney Krasner Announces New Labor Liaison to Bolster
Protections for Workers (Oct. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/philadelphia-justice/releasedistrict-attorney-krasner-announces-new-labor-liaison-to-bolster-protections-for-workers62159359ddca [https://perma.cc/P6DC-UUAJ].
50
DoorDash is a business that delivers food, beverages and other items from local
restaurants and stores to nearby customers. It employs workers to act as couriers, picking up
orders from merchants and delivering them to customers. DOORDASH
https://www.doordash.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/SU6D-XNML] (last visited Oct. 14,
2020).
51
2020 Edison Trends U.S. On-Demand Food Delivery Sales Report, EDISON TRENDS
(May 19, 2020), https://trends.edison.tech/research/on-demand-food-delivery-sales-2020
.html [https://perma.cc/H7CM-LZBH].
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independent contractors. 52 The case was brought using the civil enforcement
powers of the DA’s office under California’s Business and Professions Code
section 17200 et seq. (California’s Unfair Competition Laws). 53 The lawsuit
seeks restitution for workers, an injunction requiring DoorDash to properly
classify its delivery workers as employees, and civil penalties.
Misclassification of workers as independent contractors instead of
employees has been a widespread problem in California. 54 It has especially
negative impacts in the midst of the coronavirus outbreak because it leaves
workers without even the most basic workplace protections at the time those
are most needed. When workers are misclassified as independent contractors,
they are unlawfully denied their guaranteed rights to minimum labor
standards, including the right to minimum wage and overtime pay, meal and
rest breaks, workers’ compensation coverage, paid sick leave, family leave,
reimbursement for business expenses, and access to wage replacement
programs like disability insurance and unemployment insurance. 55
Misclassification is particularly prevalent in the gig economy. 56 During
this health crisis, gig workers like DoorDash’s couriers have seen demand
for their services skyrocket, 57 and are at risk as they provide essential

52

Press Release, S.F. Dist. Att’y, SFDA Chesa Boudin Announces Employee Protection
and Unfair Business Practices Action Against Doordash for Illegally Misclassifying Its
Delivery Workers (June 16, 2020), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/press-release/sfda-announcesaction-against-doordash/ [https://perma.cc/5MDB-5Q8Y].
53
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2020) (“[U]nfair competition shall mean and
include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .”); id. § 17204
(“Actions for relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted exclusively in a court of
competent jurisdiction by the Attorney General or a district attorney . . . .”).
54
See Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 913 (2018) (Speaking
to the pervasive problem of misclassification, the California Supreme Court cited to regulatory
agencies of both federal and state governments that found misclassification is a “very serious
problem” that was “depriving . . . millions of workers of the labor law protections to which
they are entitled”)
55
Misclassification, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELS. (Dec. 2019), https://www.dir.ca.gov
/Fraud_Prevention/Misclassification.htm [https://perma.cc/THB3-KTCW].
56
In passing California’s landmark Assembly Bill 5 addressing misclassification, the
California Legislature noted that “[r]ecent research also supports the prevalence of
misclassification and finds some of the highest misclassification rates in the economy’s
growth industries, including home care, janitorial, trucking, construction, hospitality, security,
and the app-based ‘on demand’ sector.” ASSEMBLY COMM. ON LABOR & EMPL., REPORT ON
ASSEMBLY BILL 5 (April 3, 2019).).)
57
Between March 2 and April 16, 2020, food delivery sales increased 51 percent
according to data analyzed by Edison Trends. Online Grocery Sales Up 90% & Food Delivery
Sales Up 51% Since March 2, EDISON TRENDS (May 1, 2020), https://trends.edison.tec
h/research/covid-19-online-food-services.html [https://perma.cc/UJ7Q-24ZR].
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services. 58 Yet, they do so without basic employment protections under state
and local laws as a result of these gig companies’ misclassification of their
workers as independent contractors. 59 This means that gig workers lack
access to protections such as paid sick days and medical care through
workers’ compensation coverage. 60
Health crises like COVID-19 and social movements like Black Lives
Matter reaffirm that ensuring safety and health in our communities must start
with protecting and empowering society’s most vulnerable. Dedicating
resources to curbing workplace injustices and supporting victims who suffer
harm at the hands of their employers will improve public safety and should
therefore be a priority for all District Attorneys. Now, in the midst of this
58

See COVID-19: Dasher Exemption to Shelter-in-place Orders Letter, DOORDASH
(2020), https://help.doordash.com/dashers/s/article/COVID-19-Dasher-Exemption-to-Shelte
r-in-place-Orders-Letter?language=en_US [https://perma.cc/MUL9-3BR9].
59
Instead of properly classifying their workers as employees and providing them with the
full panoply of employment benefits and protections to which they are entitled, gig companies
such Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, Postmates, and Instacart spent over $200 million to support the
passage of Proposition 22, a California voter initiative on the November 2020 ballot. Top
Contributor Lists, November 2020 General Election, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES
COMM’N (accessed Dec. 2, 2020) https://www.fppc.ca.gov/transparency/top-contributors/nov20-gen.html [https://perma.cc/F8MF-YFPH]. Proposition 22's language provides that “an appbased driver is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent with respect to the
app-based driver’s relationship with a network company” if four conditions are met and
obligates the “network company” to provide “app-based drivers” with the limited benefits
outlined in the statute, such as “a guaranteed minimum level of compensation” at “the net
earnings floor” for “all engaged time” and “a quarterly health care subsidy” for those appbased drivers who average at least fifteen hours per week of engaged time in the calendar
quarter. See Request for Title and Summary for the ‘Protect App-Based Drivers and Services
Act’, (A.G. No. 19-0026)—Amended Language (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.oag.ca.gov
/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/19-0026A1%20%28App-Based%20Drivers%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4BP-4FSC] Proposition 22 as passed will take effect on the fifth day after
the Secretary of State certifies the voting results. CAL. CONST. ART. II, § 10, subd. (a)).
60
See State of California Executive Order N-62-20 (May 6, 2020), https://tinyurl.co
m/yceb3cue [https://perma.cc/HW49-7ZDC] (declaring that “the provision of workers’
compensation benefits related to COVID-19 . . . will reduce the spread . . . and otherwise
mitigate the effects of COVID-19 among all Californians, thereby promoting public health
and safety”); LeaAnne DeRigne, Patricia Stoddard-Dare, & Linda Quinn, Workers Without
Access to Paid Sick Leave Less Likely to Take Time Off Compared to Those With Paid Sick
Leave, 35 HEALTH AFFAIRS 520, 525 (2016) (estimating that sick employees who continued
going to work infected an additional seven million people during the 2009 H1N1 Influenza
outbreak and that lack of paid sick leave resulted in an additional 1,500 deaths during that
same outbreak); Kevin Miller, Claudia Williams, & Youngmin Yi, Paid Sick Days and
Health: Cost Savings from Reduced Emergency Department Visits, INST. FOR WOMEN’S
POLICY RESEARCH, 7 (Nov. 14, 2011), https://tinyurl.com/y7htdjqh [https://perma.cc/2C735BJJ] (concluding workers who do not have paid sick days are more likely to delay necessary
medical care, which can cause minor health problems to turn into more serious and expensive
ones).
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pandemic and the country’s reckoning with structural racism, units protecting
workers’ rights are more needed than ever before.

II. DECARCERATION TO IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY AND RACIAL EQUITY
The United States incarcerates more people than any other country in
the world, 61 with 2.2 million people living in jails and prisons at any given
time. 62 Nearly twenty-five percent of them are awaiting trial in county jails,
presumed innocent, 63 and often held solely because they cannot afford a cash
bail payment that would secure their release. 64
But the problem is actually far worse than even that striking number
conveys. People enter and leave jails and prisons every day, so the number
of people who are incarcerated in a given year is much higher. There are more
than ten million people arrested annually 65—all of whom are deprived of
their liberty and separated from their home, work, family, and community.
Four and a half million more people each year remain on probation or
parole, 66 subject to random stops and searches, forced to check in with
officers sometimes multiple times a week, and required to submit to whatever
other conditions a court might require.
It is then no surprise that half of all Americans have an immediate
family member who is either currently or formerly incarcerated. 67 In theory,
incarceration serves as a form of deterrence, punishment, rehabilitation, and
61
Peter Wagner, Leah Sakala, & Josh Begley, States of Incarceration: The Global
Context, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/ [https://perma
.cc/6MMY-QNEN].
62
Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT (2020), https://www.sentencingprojec
t.org/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/6WLR-9WDU].
63
Why We Need Pretrial Reform, PRETRIAL JUST. INST. (2018), https://www.pretrial.o
rg/get-involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/#:~:text=Six%20out%20of%201
0%20people,population%20growth%20between%202000%2D2014 [https://perma.cc/C5XK
-DBVC].
64
Matt Krupnick, Bail Roulette: How the Same Minor Crime Can Cost $250 or $10,000,
GUARDIAN (Sep. 20, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/20/b
ail-disparities-across-the-us-reflect-inequality-it-is-the-poor-people-who-suffer [https://perm
a.cc/J8TU-SAU4].
65
Rebecca Neusteter & Megan O’Toole, Every Three Seconds, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Jan.
2019), https://www.vera.org/publications/arrest-trends-every-three-seconds-landing/arresttrends-every-three-seconds/overview [https://perma.cc/42NE-CNQG].
66
Probation and Parole Systems Marked by High Stakes, Missed Opportunities¸ PEW
RESEARCH (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs
/2018/09/probation-and-parole-systems-marked-by-high-stakes-missed-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/27J9-YVMY].
67
Every Second: The Impact of the Incarceration Crisis on America’s Families, FWD.US
(2018), https://everysecond.fwd.us/#chapter1-3 [https://perma.cc/V5B4-MQCC].
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protection for society from people who cause harm. But there is scant
empirical evidence that incarceration is an effective response to most crime; 68
in fact, incarceration tends to increase, not decrease, recidivism—especially
for lower risk individuals. 69 Since the vast majority of people incarcerated
will be released sooner or later, 70 building long-term safety means relying on
more than just incarceration.
Not only does the United States incarcerate too many people, it does so
in ways that have tremendously disparate impacts based on race. 71 Though
even before 2020 San Francisco had made massive strides compared to other
jurisdictions, San Francisco’s incarceration rate for African Americans was
still substantially higher than the rates of Los Angeles, Washington D.C., and
Chicago, and more than six times the rate of New York City. 72 San
Francisco’s population is approximately five percent Black, 73 but nearly fifty
percent of the jail is Black. 74
Black and Brown people in San Francisco are more likely to be harmed
by the criminal justice system. 75 They are more likely to be victims of
68

Incarceration may be an effective way to warehouse people and separate them from
society. While crimes, including violent crimes, are still committed in prisons and jails, society
at large is protected.
69
Paul Gendreau & Claire Goggin, The Effects of Prison Sentences on Recidivism, PRISON
POL’Y (1999), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/e199912.htm [https://perma.cc/Q2WAKZRS].
70
As many as fourteen percent of people in prisons are serving life sentences. The Facts
of Life Sentences, SENT’G PROJECT 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/Facts-of-Life.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6VB-BCNX]. However, most
people arrested experience short periods of incarceration: over 10 million people are booked
into county jails every year. Zhen Zeng, Jail Inmates in 2018, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (2020),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SDR-PQVC].
71
Racial Disparity, Issues, SENT’G PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/issue
s/racial-disparity/ [https://perma.cc/HBD4-VLBX].
72
Compare data available at Incarceration Trends, San Francisco County, CA, VERA
INST. OF JUST., http://trends.vera.org/rates/san-francisco-county-ca [https://perma.cc/JK533AWZ].
73
San Francisco County, California, Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/sanfranciscocountycalifornia [https://perma.cc/R578-CU
DH].
74
Agenda, Safety and Justice Challenge Subcommittee, SAN FRANCISCO SENT’G COMM’N
(Aug. 18, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://dev-district-attorney-wp.pantheonsite.io/wp-content/upl
oads/2020/08/Agenda-and-Meeting-Packet_SJC-Subcommittee_8-18-20_v2.pdf. [https://per
ma.cc/J2AW-Z2LB].
75
John MacDonald & Steven Raphael, An Analysis of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Case Dispositions and Sentencing Outcomes for Criminal Cases Presented to and Processed
by the Office of the San Francisco District Attorney, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y (Dec. 2017), https://sfdis
trictattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Analysis-Racial-and-Ethnic-Disparities-in-
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crime, 76 less likely to report crime, and more likely to be stopped by the
police. Once stopped, they are more likely to be searched without their
consent, despite being less likely to be found with contraband. 77 Black San
Franciscans are over seven times more likely to be arrested than their white
counterparts, and they are eleven times more likely to be booked into county
jail. 78 They are held in pretrial custody longer 79 and are over ten times more
likely to be convicted of a crime. 80 After conviction, Black defendants
receive sentences that are, on average, twenty-eight percent longer than those
received by white defendants. 81 Disparately negative encounters with
authority figures start from a young age; students of color are much more
likely to be targets of zero-tolerance discipline policies in schools, 82
facilitating a school-to-prison pipeline that often begins a lifetime of
entanglement in the criminal justice system. 83
Case-Dispos-and-Sentencing-Outcomes-FINAL-REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8CW9QG5Y].
76
African Americans Have Made Up More Than Half Of Homicides in San Francisco in
2015, CBS SF BAY AREA (June 11, 2015, 10:57 AM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.co
m/2015/06/11/african-americans-have-made-up-more-than-half-of-homicides-in-sanfrancisco-in-2015/ [https://perma.cc/B2AJ-3Y3T]; Timothy Williams, San Francisco Police
Disproportionately Search African Americans, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2016)
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/12/us/san-francisco-police-disproportionately-searchafrican-americans-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/N5WX-XW4P].
77
Report of The Blue Ribbon Panel on Transparency, Accountability, and Fairness in
Law Enforcement, SF BLUE RIBBON PANEL, 30 (2016) https://sfdistrictattorney.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/BRP_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/EZ2F-KAK4].
78
San Francisco Justice Reinvestment Initiative: Racial and Ethnic Disparities Analysis
for the Reentry Council, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST. FOR JUV. JUST. FAIRNESS & EQUITY 5
(2013), https://www.burnsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/JRI_SF-RED-AnalysisSUMMARY-of-FINDINGS.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY3C-B3ZX].
79
Emily Owens, Erin M. Kerrison, & Bernardo Santos Da Silveira, Examining Racial
Disparities in Criminal Case Outcomes Among Indigent Defendants in San Francisco,
QUATTRONE CTR. FOR THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST. 2 (2017), https://www.law.upenn.edu
/live/files/6792-examining-racial-disparities-may-2017-summary [https://perma.cc/ABU29Q27].
80
W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST. FOR JUV. JUST FAIRNESS & EQUITY, supra note 78 at 5.
81
Owens, Kerrison, & Da Silveira, supra note 79 at 2.
82
Zero tolerance policies treat both minor and major infractions severely as opposed to
graduated discipline approaches. See, e.g., Russell J. Skiba, Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence:
An Analysis of School Disciplinary Practice, IND. EDUC. POLICY CTR., 11 (2000), https://web
.archive.org/web/20140824031650/http://www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3GQT-TK9F].
83
Expansive Survey of America’s Public Schools Revels Troubling Racial Disparities,
U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., (Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/expansivesurvey-americas-public-schools-reveals-troubling-racial-disparities [https://perma.cc/F9S4C6S6]; Farnel Maxime, Zero-Tolerance Policies and the School to Prison Pipeline, SHARED
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Collectively, these facts may be shocking to those not directly impacted,
and they serve as a chilling reminder of the lasting consequences of centuries
of systemic racism beginning with slavery, through Jim Crow, housing
policy, and the Drug War. 84 Society must not allow these disparate outcomes
to persist—and, perhaps surprisingly, needed changes can come from a
prosecutor’s office. SFDAO has taken considerable steps this year to address
the problems of overincarceration. This Part reviews the following
initiatives: (A) creation of primary caregiver diversion; (B) eradication of
status enhancements; (C) elimination of cash bail; and (D) reducing the jail
population.
A. PRIMARY CAREGIVER DIVERSION

Incarcerating primary caregiver parents can have devastating
consequences for children left behind. 85 Black children are six times as likely
as white children to have a parent incarcerated; these children are victimized
both by their parents’ choices and society’s commitment to meting out harsh
punishments. 86 The collateral consequences of parental incarceration may
undermine public safety by placing children at risk and perpetuating an
intergenerational cycle of crime and incarceration. 87 Particularly for primary
caregivers who commit nonviolent offenses (and thus pose a comparatively
lower risk to society than those accused of violent crime), the potential public
safety benefits of incarceration are outweighed and undermined by the
trauma and attendant consequences dependent children suffer. Recognizing
JUST., (Jan. 18, 2018), sharedjustice.org/domestic-justice/2017/12/21/zero-tolerance-policiesand-the-school-to-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/4CC4-UP7V]; School-to-Prison-Pipeline
Infographic, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/school-prison-pipeline/sch
ool-prison-pipeline-infographic [https://perma.cc/Y4JE-HHSH].
84
See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012); Mike Males &
William Armaline, San Francisco’s Arrest Rates of African Americans for Drug Felonies
Worsens, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST. (2012), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/docum
ents/Drug_Policy_2012_in_SF.pdf [https://perma.cc/U66E-WD4Q].
85
See generally Chesa Boudin, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Child’s
Constitutional Right to the Family Relationship, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 77 (2011)
(gathering sources, describing the scope of parental incarceration and the rights of children
left behind).
86
Leila Morsy & Richard Rothstein, Mass Incarceration and Children’s Outcomes,
ECON. POL’Y INST., (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/mass-incarceration-andchildrens-outcomes/ [https://perma.cc/M9J8-XSSV].
87
Jeremy Travis, Elizabeth Cincotta Mcbride, & Amy L. Solomon, Families Left Behind:
The Hidden Costs of Incarceration and Reentry, URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CTR., 2 (2005);
Keva M. Miller, The Impact of Parental Incarceration on Children: An Emerging Need for
Effective Interventions, 23 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 472, 478 (2006); Nkechi Taifa
& Catherine Beane, Integrative Solutions to Interrelated Issues: A Multidisciplinary Look
Behind the Cycle of Incarceration, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 283, 289 (2009).
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this, in January of 2020 California enacted Penal Code section 1001.83,
which allows local jurisdictions to implement primary caregiver diversion
for non-violent and non-serious crimes. 88
SFDAO became the first prosecutor’s office in the state to implement
the new diversion law. 89 The policy’s basic premise is that society is safer
when primary caregivers are free to be at home supporting their children
rather than in cages. Eligible defendants can earn a dismissal through a
rigorous diversion program that includes parenting classes for a minimum of
six months.
The hope is that by diverting primary caregivers away from the criminal
justice system and incentivizing them to care for their dependent children,
we will help break the cycle of incarceration and keep communities safer.
Although the policy is facially race-neutral, it will disproportionately benefit
children of color, as their parents are overrepresented in the criminal justice
system.
B. STATUS ENHANCEMENTS

California’s “tough on crime” era led to what are known as “status”
sentencing enhancements, 90 which punish status rather than conduct. This era
contributed to mass incarceration, devastated communities of color,
expanded prison budgets at a cost to schools, separated families and
communities, and, in many ways, actually undermined public safety. 91
The use of sentencing enhancements in San Francisco accounts for
about one out of every four years served in jail and prison. 92 Status

88
Violent and serious offenses are terms of art and California law lists qualifying offenses.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5(C), 1192.7, & 1192.8 (West 2018).
89
Meyer Gorelick, Boudin Launches Pretrial Diversion Program for Parents of Minor
Children, S.F. EXAM’R (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/boudin-announ
ces-diversion-program-for-eligible-caregivers/ [https://perma.cc/8GTP-JK22].
90
California sentencing law is tremendously complex and beyond the scope of this article.
In short, most felony offenses have a statutorily prescribed low, mid, and high term from which
a sentencing judge may choose. Those terms can be “enhanced” based on specific conduct in
the underlying offense—for example causing great bodily injury, or personal use of a
firearm—or based on the status of the defendant—for example membership in a criminal street
gang or prior convictions. See generally J. Richard Couzens & Tricia A. Bigelow, Felony
Sentencing After Realignment, CA. COURTS (May 2017), https://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/
documents/felony_sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/N46P-3G3L].
91
See generally Gendreau & Goggin, supra note 69.
92
Elan Dagenais, Raphael Ginsburg, Sharad Goel, Joseph Nudell, & Robert Weisberg,
Sentencing Enhancements and Incarceration: San Francisco, 2005-2017, STAN.
COMPUTATIONAL POL’Y LAB, at 1 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://policylab.stanford.edu/mediaf/enh
ancements_2019-10-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/QB4F-KQ3Z].
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enhancements—mostly Proposition 8 priors 93 and Three Strikes 94
enhancements—account for half of the time served for enhancements. 95 A
2019 Stanford study found that these status enhancements exacerbate the
already large racial disparities that exist in sentencing and concluded that
California could substantially reduce incarceration by ceasing to use
enhancements. 96
California’s mass incarceration problem is rooted in the extreme
sentencing laws passed by voters in the 1990s, including the 1994 Three
Strikes Law. 97 The Three Strikes Law doubled sentences for those with
certain deemed “serious” or “violent” felony convictions known as “strikes”
and led to life sentences for those with two prior strike offenses. 98 This meant
that overnight, potential sentences for many people with prior convictions
rose to double, triple, or greater from the previous maximums. The impact of
the Three Strikes Law is staggering. In 1990, California had a prison
population of 92,604. 99 In 1999, five years after the passage of Three Strikes,
California had increased its population to 163,000. 100 By 2006, the prison
population had ballooned to over 175,000 prisoners. 101 In June of 2019, the
state prison population was 125,472. 102 According to the Stanford Three
93
Proposition 8 created so called “nickel priors” whereby any prior conviction for a
serious or violent felony can add five additional years to a future serious or violent felony.
94
See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality, 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 395 (1997) (explaining the three strikes sentencing framework).
95
Dagenais, Ginsburg, Goel, Nudell, & Weisberg, supra note 92, at 1.
96
Id. at 10.
97
See generally Mugambi Jouet, Mass Incarceration Paradigm Shift?: Convergence In
an Age of Divergence, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 703, 721 (2019) (highlighting extreme
three strikes sentences and the contribution to mass incarceration); Evelyn J. Patterson, Hidden
Disparities: Decomposing Inequalities in Time Served in California, 1985-2009, 49 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 467, 470 (2015) (describing three strikes sentencing as a major contributor to mass
incarceration in California).
98
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667; Barry Krisberg, How do you Eat an Elephant? Reducing Mass
Incarceration in California One Small Bite at a Time, 664 ANNALS 136, 140 (2016).
99
James Stephan, Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 1990, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT., at 2 (May 1, 1992), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4067.
[https://perma.cc/FE9P-NC9R].
100
Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 1999, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., at 3 (Aug. 2000),
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search
?q=cache:McWUsXQUOOUJ:https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en
&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-1-d [https://perma.cc/4HSA-RJCU].
101
William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2006, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., at 14 (Dec. 2007),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.p
df+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-b-1-d. [https://perma.cc/85YZ-APFP].
102
CAL. DEP’T OF CORRS. & REHAB., SPRING 2020 POPULATION PROJECTIONS at v (2020),
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/research/population-reports-2/ [https://perma.cc/9EVT-HHJ9].
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Strikes Project, forty-five percent of inmates serving life sentences under the
Three Strikes law are Black and the law is applied disproportionately against
mentally ill and physically disabled defendants. 103 One study found that, “the
three-strikes law did not decrease serious crime or petty theft rates below the
level expected on the basis of preexisting trends.” 104
The Three Strikes Law is not the only status-based sentencing
enhancement law that has contributed to mass incarceration and racial
disparities in California. Gang enhancements 105 have been criticized as
unfairly targeting particularly young men of color. 106 Analysis by the LA
Times suggests that the CALGang database, a statewide list of gang members
and affiliates, is outdated, inaccurate, and rife with abuse. 107 According to
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation data from 2019,
more than 90 percent of adults with a gang enhancement in state prison are
either Black or Latinx. 108 What’s more, as Fordham Law Professor John Pfaff
(who studies the causes and effects of mass incarceration) explains: there is
strong empirical support for declining to charge these status
enhancements. 109 Lengthy sentences imposed by strike laws and gang
enhancements provide little additional deterrence, often incarcerate past what

103

See generally Dagenais, Ginsburg, Goel, Nudell, & Weisberg, supra note 92; THREE
STRIKES PROJECT, Three Strikes Basics, https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-justice-advocacyproject/three-strikes-basics/ [https://perma.cc/XC3N-5NLW].
104
Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, Three Strikes and You’re Out”: The Impact
of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, 43 CRIME & DELINQ.
457, 457 (1997).
105
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.22 et seq. (West 2018).
106
See, e.g., Fareed Nassor Hayat, Preserving Due Process: Applying Monell Bifurcation
to State Gang Cases, 88 U. CIN. L. REV. 129, 138 (2019) (“Legal scholars have proven,
through empirical data, that the use of gang affiliation as a basis of enforcement is not only
unduly prejudicial, but also inherently racist.”).
107
See Anita Chabria, Kevin Rector & Cindy Chang, California Bars Police from Using
LAPD Records in Gang Database. Critics Want It Axed., L.A. TIMES (July 14, 2020, 10:49
AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-03/california-attorney-general-xavie
r-becerra-changes-course-on-revamping-the-states-gang-database [https://perma.cc/6HHTPT4D]; see also Anita Chabria, Leila Miller & Nicole Santa Cruz, LAPD Scandal Opens
Window into California’s Secret Gang Database as Reforms Debated, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 3,
2020, 9:36 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-14/california-barspolice-from-using-lapd-records-in-gang-database-as-scandal-widens
[https://perma.cc/A5ME-7XS2].
108
Abené Clayton, 92% Black or Latino: The California Laws that Keep Minorities in
Prison, GUARDIAN, (Nov. 26, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/nov/26/california-gang-enhancements-laws-black-latinos.
[https://perma.cc/
P26X-SRYV].
109
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION 192–94
(2017).
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is required for public safety, and may even lead to greater rates of reoffending
in the long run. 110
Pfaff cited a growing body of empirical studies which have made clear
that what effectively deters violent and antisocial behavior is not the threat
of a long sentence imposed at some point in the future on those limited cases
that result in an arrest and conviction, 111 but instead the risk of detection and
apprehension in the first place. 112 Effective policing deters; long sentences
do little. 113 Some studies indicate that spending more time in prison may
actually increase the risk of later reoffending. 114 This makes sense: as the
number of traumas experienced in prison grows, the ability to reintegrate
after release may fall. This effect is especially pronounced in private
prisons. 115
Given this backdrop, SFDAO announced that—absent extraordinary
circumstances—it would no longer seek strike convictions against juveniles,
allege prior strikes 116 or five year priors, 117 or use gang charges or
enhancements. 118 The presumption is that the sentence for the underlying
crime, and the ability to charge appropriate conduct enhancements (e.g.,
personal infliction of great bodily injury, personal use of a firearm), are
sufficient to protect public safety and hold people accountable.

110

Id.; see also Sarah Lynn Van Hofwegan, Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at
California’s Step Act, 18. S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 679, 688–89 (2009), https://gou
ld.usc.edu/why/students/orgs/ilj/assets/docs/18-3%20Van%20Hofwegen.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/W3HP-YV52].
111
PFAFF, supra note 109, at 192–93.
112
Id. at 193–94.
113
Id. at 194.
114
Gendreau & Goggin, supra, note 69 (finding that longer prison sentences slightly
increased recidivism); Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson & Daniel S. Nagin, Prisons Do
Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science, 91 PRISON J. 48S (2011) (finding
that incarceration does not reduce recidivism and, instead, has a criminogenic effect).
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/258194311_Prisons_Do_Not_Reduce_Recidivism
_The_High_Cost_of_Ignoring_Science [https://perma.cc/77BU-WG2R].
115
Derek Gilna, Report Says Private Prison Companies Increase Recidivism, PRISON
LEGAL NEWS (May 5, 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2017/may/5/report-saysprivate-prison-companies-increase-recidivism/ [https://perma.cc/K8QD-T76A].
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CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(d)–(e), 1170.12(a), (c) (West 2020).
117
Id. § 667(a)(1).
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Evan Sernoffsky, DA Chesa Boudin Sets New Policies on SF Police Stops, Gang
Enhancements, Three Strikes, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/cri
me/article/San-Francisco-DA-Chesa-Boudin-sets-new-policies-15091160.php
[https://perma.cc/4F9N-CHHR].
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C. MONEY BAIL

Commercial money bail is a uniquely American phenomena: 119 an
explicitly wealth-based discriminatory practice central to the determination
of pretrial custody status in most jurisdictions in America that undermines
the integrity of the entire criminal justice system. The private, for-profit bail
bonds industry is a $2 billion a year business. 120 The number of people
detained in the United States prior to being convicted—presumed innocent—
has grown from less than 125,000 on any given day in 1983 to more than
460,000 today. 121
The money bail system is a cancer at the heart of America’s criminal
justice system. As soon as a rich person is arrested, they can buy their way
out almost without exception, and remain at liberty while they fight their
case. An identically situated poor person, by contrast, languishes in jail for
days even if no charges are filed, simply because of their inability to make a
monetary payment. The impact of even short periods of incarceration on
people’s lives and future prospects is hard to overstate, as is the impact on
the likely outcome of criminal charges. That is, not only are people who are
incarcerated pretrial exposed to violence, disease, termination of
employment, eviction, loss of child custody and the like, they are also more
likely to plead guilty. 122
Pretrial detention negatively impacts both a person’s criminal case and
their wellbeing in general. 123 Several studies reveal that those detained
pretrial are substantially more likely to be convicted, likely owing to
increased guilty pleas as a result of the pressure of incarceration. 124 The
119

Along with the Philippines, the United States is the only country in the world with a
for profit bail industry. Stephanie Wykstra, Bail Reform, Which Could Save Millions of
Unconvicted People from Jail, Explained, VOX (Oct. 17, 2008, 7:30 AM),
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120
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CITIZEN (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/bail-bond-industry-2billion-poverty/ [https://perma.cc/LRH3-8SYS].
121
WEndy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2019.html
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122
Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 711 (2017).
123
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INST. 13–14, 25–26 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/b
ailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4H4-EV7A].
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disparities do not end there, however. Pretrial detainees are also more likely
to be sentenced to incarceration, 125 and, even with controls in place, their
sentences are substantially longer than those of otherwise comparable
releasees. 126 A detained person may accept an overly punitive plea deal
because detention impaired her ability to gather evidence or meet with her
lawyer. She may be less motivated to fight the charges when the fixed costs
of incarceration have already been paid: stigma, loss of employment, housing
or child custody, etc. 127
Pretrial detention also causes substantial and often long-term harm to an
individual’s wellbeing. People held in jail pretrial may lose their jobs due to
absence, 128 and, for many, their homes, apartments, or spot in a shelter.
Medical care is disrupted, and those who receive government benefits often
lose their health insurance, housing assistance, and other necessary subsidies
when incarcerated. 129 Families are impacted because parents are unable to
care for their children, who may have to move to another relative’s home or
enter the foster care system. Education and home life stability disappear, and
children suffer lasting trauma as a result. 130
Likely because it is so destabilizing and stigmatizing, people detained
pretrial are actually more likely to reoffend in the future. 131 Increased

https://academic.oup.com/jleo/article/34/4/511/5100740 [https://perma.cc/ANM4-MNHL];
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pre-Trial Detention on
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AM. ECON. REV. 201, 203 (2016); https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/wdob
bie/files/dgy_bail_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ5Z-5UUE]; Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman
& Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45
J. Legal Stud. 471, 471 (2016); Paul S. http://www.columbia.edu/~cjh2182/Gupta
HansmanFrenchman.pdf [https://perma.cc/43RD-BAME]; Heaton, Mayson, Stevenson,
supra note 122.
125
Heaton, Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 122, at 717; Stevenson, supra note 124, at
513.
126
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Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J. Law & Econ. 529, 546 (2017).
127
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supra note 123.
128
See, e.g., DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1023 (Md. 2019) (ruling that people
have a right to counsel at initial bail hearings under the state’s constitution, in part, because a
“bail determination can have devastating effects on arrested individuals,” including for many
who “may be employed in low wage jobs which could be easily lost because of incarceration”).
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130
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Gupta, Hansmen, & Frenchman, supra note 124; Heaton, Mayson, & Stevenson, supra
note 122.
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recidivism is found even after controlling for the initial bail amount, charged
offense, demographics, and criminal history. 132
The goal of any pretrial release system should be to simultaneously: “(1)
maximize release; (2) maximize public safety; and (3) maximize court
appearance.” 133 Despite its widespread use, secured money bail fails to
maximize release, serves essentially no public safety function, and is not
necessary to ensure court appearance. As one federal court found, under
California law, “there is no rational relationship between the setting of bail
and the state’s legitimate interests.” 134 The failure of money bond to
maximize release is uncontroversial and well-documented. 135 Research also
shows, however, that, as a release mechanism, money bond does not advance
public safety. Paying money, up front, to get out of jail does not correlate
with a reduced likelihood of committing a new offense while on pretrial
release. 136 Any argument that it could have a public safety impact ignores not
only the empirical data, but everything that is currently known about criminal
deterrence. 137
But what about ensuring a defendant’s appearance in court? In 2017,
New Jersey ended its cash bail system. While its pretrial jail population
“plummet[ed],” people continued to show up for court at “roughly the same
rate.” 138 And although some studies have shown modest increases in court
appearance rates by those who have posted secured money bail, 139 other
132

Gupta, Hansmen, & Frenchman, supra note 124.
Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide for Pretrial
Practitioners and a Framework for American Pretrial Reform, NAT’L INST. OF CORR. 84
(2014), http://www.clebp.org/images/2014-09-04_Fundamentals_of_Bail.pdf [https://perma.
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134
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29, 2017).
135
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ssets/pdf_file/0017/1655/unsecured-bonds-the-as-effective-and-most-efficient-pretrialrelease-option.ashx.pdf [https://perma.cc/8E2J-4KLZ] (showing money bail increases jail bed
use).
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137
See, e.g., Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, in 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 187 (2003) (explaining that the threat
of harsh or mandatory prison sentences has no measurable deterrent effect on crime).
138
Nicholas Puglies, Did NJ Bail Reform Cause a Surge In Crime? Court Analysis Says
No,” NORTHJERSEY.COM (Apr. 2, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.northjersey.com/story/n
ews/new-jersey/2019/04/02/nj-bail-reform-no-crime-surge-pretrial-release/3336423002/
[https://perma.cc/29V8-3BST].
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studies show no effect whatsoever. 140 Even if money bail promotes court
appearance to some degree, which is debatable, its effectiveness pales in
comparison to low-cost interventions such as providing automated court
reminders in the mail, over the phone, or via text message. 141
For all these reasons, and more, 142 SFDAO implemented a policy
prohibiting attorneys from asking the court to impose money bail at
arraignment or in other court proceedings. 143 The policy sought to replace a
wealth-based system with a risk-based system. 144 As the U.S. Supreme Court
has held, “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or
without trial is the carefully limited exception.” 145 Not only does the new
policy reflect the constitutional values of equal protection, due process,
presumption of innocence, and liberty as a norm in our society, but it also
helps protect public safety by seeking to detain those who are shown to be
too dangerous, regardless of their ability to come up with a monetary
payment.
project.org/assets/files/BailFineReform_EA_121818_6PM.pdf [https://perma.cc/HJ3D-K2
QQ] (discussing two studies).
140
Jones, supra note 135, at 11.
141
Colin Doyle, Chiraag Bains, & Brook Hopkins, Bail Reform: A Guide for State and
Local Policymakers, CRIMINAL JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, at 4, 22
(2019), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6GX39J4]. Additionally, simply because a person missed a single court date does not mean the
person has absconded with no intent to ever appear. Indeed, the opposite is true. Traci
Schlesinger from the Pretrial Justice Institute said, “What we’re finding is that when people
aren’t making it to court for their first appointment, most likely they’ll come to their second
appointment—and nearly everyone makes it by the third.” Ethan Corey & Puck Lo, The
‘Failure to Appear’ Fallacy, THE APPEAL (Jan. 9, 2019), https://theappeal.org/the-failure-toappear-fallacy/ [https://perma.cc/7YDM-CDC2]. “Nor are missed appointments unique to the
criminal justice system. Multiple studies report no-show rates of 15 to 30 percent for medical
appointments, which is about the same as the criminal court FTA rate in most U.S.
jurisdictions. Some parts of the civil court system, like small claims court and housing court,
have absentee rates as high as 95 percent.” Id.
142
For example, non-refundable bail fees in San Francisco strip mostly poor and working
women of color of their savings and assets. See Do the Math: Money Bail Doesn’t Add Up for
San Francisco, FINANCIAL JUST. PROJECT, CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F. at 6, 11 (2017),
https://sfgov.org/financialjustice/sites/default/files/2020-04/2017.6.27%20Bail%20Report%
20FINAL_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YDZ-PE2B].
143
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Shortly thereafter, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated
even greater changes. Once COVID-19 spread to the United States and it
became clear that jails and prisons were high risk for becoming vectors for
the virus, the California Judicial Council established a range of emergency
rules, including one which mandated that all counties set bail, during the
post-arrest and pre-arraignment stage, at $0 for a wide range of
misdemeanors and non-violent felonies. 146 This state-wide emergency
policy—which began April, 6, 2020—helped avoid introducing people
potentially carrying the virus into local jails by instead treating them exactly
the same way that the wealthy have been treated for decades: following an
arrest, the police conduct a booking and then grant immediate release with a
future court date. The policy, together with falling crime rates, has
contributed to historic declines in jail populations across the state. 147
Despite the fact that COVID-19 continues to be a major threat to jail
populations, and that money bail continues to be a discriminatory institution
which undermines public safety and the integrity of the criminal justice
system, the California Judicial Council voted to end the zero bail policy
barely a month after it took effect. 148 Several counties opted to continue using
the zero bail policy voluntarily but San Francisco Superior Court refused,
over the objection of SFDAO and other stakeholders. 149 San Francisco wants
and deserves a justice system that keeps residents safe without relying on
wealth-based discrimination. San Francisco has demonstrated that it is
possible to use risk rather than wealth as a basis for determining pretrial
detention or release conditions. In 2020 San Francisco and the entire state, to
some extent, witnessed the benefits that come from eliminating money bail
at the arrest/pre-arraignment phase for non-violent/non-serious crimes: jail
146
See News Release from Merrill Balassone, Cal. Courts Newsroom, Judicial Council,
Chief Justice End Some Emergency Measures as California and Courts Expand Reopening,
(June 10, 2020), https://newsroom.courts.ca.gov/news/judicial-council-chief-justice-endsome-emergency-measures-as-california-and-courts-expand-reopening
[https://perma.cc/5YTF-2W8Z]; Appendix I: Emergency Rules Related to Covid-19, CAL.
COURTS (August 13, 2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/appendix-i.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LU36-BGQ7].
147
Joseph Hayes & Heather Harris, California’s Jail Population Has Plummeted During
COVID-19, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (May 8, 2020), https://www.ppic.org/blog/californiasjail-population-has-plummeted-during-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/MB3V-VHUF].
148
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populations decreased significantly, mitigating grave public health risks, and
crime fell.
D. JAIL POPULATION REDUCTION 150

San Francisco’s county jails are housed in several separate physical
structures; two of these jails are within, or adjacent to, San Francisco’s Hall
of Justice. The Hall of Justice itself is a seismically unsafe building
containing toxic chemicals and presenting a wide range of other public safety
concerns, making it an unfit place for people to work, much less live. 151
Closing the Hall of Justice, especially the jails that house incarcerated people
and jail staff 24 hours a day, has been an issue of public concern for years. 152
Closing the jail housed on top of the Hall of Justice (“CJ4”)—was a hotbutton issue in the 2019 DA race 153 even before the pandemic hit. During my
campaign, I emphasized the need to close CJ4 as part of a broader
commitment to decreasing reliance on incarceration, because I recognized
the ways in which mass incarceration undermines public safety, diverts
resources away from more effective interventions, and needlessly tears
families and communities apart. 154 Then COVID-19 clarified another major
150

For a more detailed discussion of SFDAO’s jail population reduction efforts in the
context of COVID-19 see Dylan Yep, Tara Anderson, & Todd Faulkenberry, An Epidemic
Inside A Pandemic, The San Francisco District Attorney’s Office, (Nov. 30, 2020)
https://sfdistrictattorney.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Justice-Driven-Data-An-EpidemicInside-a-Pandemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PLB-GMMN].
151 Kristen Szi, Unions Demand City Removes Workers From Crumbling Hall of Justice
Building in San Francisco, ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017), https://abc7news.com/san-franciscohall-of-justice-building-unions-demand-action-seismically-unsafe/1730621/
[https://perma.cc/2H94-558V]. For example: jail sewage spills continue to impose a fiscal and
human toll on the City, Michael Barba, Supes Approve $2.1M Settlement Over Sewage Spills
at SF’s Hall of Justice Jail, S.F. EXAM’R (July 14, 2020, 4:45 PM), https://www.sfexami
ner.com/news/supes-approve-2-1m-settlement-over-sewage-spills-at-sfs-hall-of-justice-jail/
[https://perma.cc/9SV5-4384], and jail staff have been accused of forcing incarcerated people
to fight against each other, Evan Sernoffsky & Erin Allday, SF Deputy in ‘Fight Club’ Case
Was Previously Accused of Beating, Breaking Inmate’s Ribs, S.F. CHRON. (July 23, 2019,
10:00 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/SF-deputy-in-fight-club-case-waspreviously-14118153.php [https://perma.cc/T8UL-F4LF].
152
See, e.g., Res. 2-16 (S.F. Bd. Of Supervisors 2016), https://www.sfdph.org/dph/f
iles/jrp/BoardofSupervisorsResolution2-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NH7-TZX9].
153
Bryan Schatz, Is Chesa Boudin Radical Enough?, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 9, 2019),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/11/is-chesa-boudin-radical-enough/
[https://perma.cc/UTD2-8AHP].
154
Chesa Boudin (@chesaboudin), How to Reduce the Jail Population, INSTAGRAM (Sept.
10, 2019), Gabe Stutman, Chesa Boudin, San Francisco’s D.A.-elect, talks homelessness,
Jewishness and taking on the establishment, JEWISH NEWS OF NORTHERN CA. (December 26,
2019), https://www.jweekly.com/2019/12/26/chesa-boudin-san-franciscos-d-a-elect-talkshomelessness-jewishness-and-taking-on-the-establishment/ [https://perma.cc/XET4-AJVH].
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way in which mass incarceration undermines public safety: jails and prisons
create ideal conditions for the deadly spread of the virus, not only to those
who are incarcerated and those working in prisons and jails, but to
surrounding communities as well. 155
When I took office in January 2020, San Francisco’s jails had an
average daily total population of 1,164 people, 156 and reached a high of 1,238
on January 21. 157 On March 24, 2020, Dr. Lisa Pratt, Director of Jail Health
Services, authored a public letter calling on San Francisco’s criminal justice
stakeholders to reduce the total jail population to “a target goal of 700-800
incarcerated people” to allow her staff to mitigate the spread of infection and
enable social distancing. 158 COVID-19 brought a new urgency to my broader
commitment to reducing reliance on incarceration.
In close partnership with the jail medical team and all the San Francisco
Justice Partners, 159 SFDAO worked quickly to safely decrease the jail
population. The team focused on releasing people who were at high medical
risk and posed low public safety risk, regularly and systematically reviewing
and triaging the entire jail population, and deploying the following strategies
on a case-by-case basis to safely reduce the jail population:
• Release with narrowly tailored conditions for people charged
with misdemeanors or non-violent felonies;
• Expedite release for people with upcoming release dates;
• Expand the use of housing referrals and referrals to residential
programs until space and funding ran out;

155

See Brendan Saloner, Kalind Parish, Julie A. Ward, Grace DiLaura & Sharon
Dolovich, COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State Prisons, 324(6) JAMA 602–03
(2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2768249 [https://perma.cc/99L4HKUP]; Eric Lofgren, Kristian Lum, Aaron Horowitz, Brooke Madubuonwu & Nina
Fefferman, The Epidemiological Implications of Incarceration Dynamics in Jails for
Community, Corrections Officer, and Incarcerated Population Risks from COVID-19 (May 4,
2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.04.08.2
0058842v2 [https://perma.cc/4HLV-TYSQ]; Bob Egelko, San Quentin Coronavirus Outbreak
Apparently Result of Missed Steps by Prison Overseer, S.F. CHRON. (July 20, 2020, 5:56 PM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/San-Quentin-coronavirus-outbreak-apparently15421664.php [https://perma.cc/9554-4ZGJ].
156
City Performance Scorecards: County Jail Population, S.F. SHERIFF’S DEPT.,
https://sfgov.org/scorecards/public-safety/county-jail-population [https://perma.cc/S9AM8YGR].
157
Daily jail count spreadsheets available from author.
158
Letter on file with author.
159
Including the San Francisco Pre-Trial Diversion Project, Adult Probation, the San
Francisco Superior Court, the San Francisco Public Defender, the San Francisco Superior
Court, and many more.
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Prioritize non-jail alternatives for elderly people and those with
significant medical risks;
• Encourage settlement of cases that could resolve for probation
supervision; and
• Defer the transfer of people in custody in other jurisdictions
with non-serious warrants out of San Francisco.
These efforts yielded results. The jail population fell to a low of 696 on
April 30, 2020 160 and has stabilized in the mid-700s since then—nearly a
forty percent decrease over the January high. Moreover, focusing closely on
every individual in jail and examining whether their ongoing incarceration
outweighed the increased risk of COVID-19 resulted in some surprising
finds. For example, the team identified a young woman with a high-risk
pregnancy who had no criminal history and was serving a county jail
sentence for a misdemeanor. Our reentry partners found a residential prenatal
care facility willing to house her in lieu of the jail time. Another woman with
severe mental illness who had been court ordered to a secure mental health
treatment facility was languishing in jail because the City failed to make a
bed available. Pressure from SFDAO helped expedite her placement in a noncarceral secure setting. Though, it should not have taken COVID-19 to force
these decisions. SFDAO is committed to using incarceration as a last resort
even after the pandemic ends, to fostering a culture of carefully and regularly
reviewing every single in-custody case for possible settlement or release, and
to remembering the ways in which over-reliance on incarceration can
actually undermine public safety.
The jail population declined during this period in parallel with an
historic drop in crime. 161 From March 17, 2020, when San Francisco’s shelter
in place order took effect, 162 through November 8, 2020, overall reported
crime reported fell 32.9 percent. 163 This decrease in the jail population along
with a decrease in crime rates is significant for at least two reasons. First, it
•

160

Daily jail count spreadsheets available from author.
ACLU Analytics, Decarceration and Crime During COVID-19, ACLU (July 27,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/smart-justice/decarceration-and-crime-during-covid-19/
[https://perma.cc/827U-BJ93].
162
Erin Allday, Bay Area Orders ‘Shelter in Place,’ Only Essential Business Open in 6
Counties, S.F. CHRON. (last updated Mar. 19, 2020, 3:33 PM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
local-politics/article/Bay-Area-must-shelter-in-place-Only-15135014.php
[https://perma.cc/76FG-7CEE].
163
Crime Dashboard, S.F. POLICE DEPT., https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/staysafe/crime-data/crime-dashboard [https://perma.cc/8FNY-ABWW].
161
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suggests that it is possible to safely decarcerate. 164 Second, falling crime rates
directly contributed to a decrease in the jail population as fewer people were
brought into the jail every day. 165 As a result of this unprecedented, and thus
far sustained, decrease in the jail population, CJ4 was permanently closed in
September 2020, 166 and SFDAO has saved the city tens of millions of dollars
in incarceration costs and demonstrated a model for rapid, safe decarceration.

III. POLICE AND PROSECUTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
The rise of the Black Lives Matter movement from a relatively small
protest movement to a national crusade in spring 2020 made clear the
overwhelming public hunger for police and prosecutor accountability.167
Many of the problems leading to police and prosecutor impunity are multifaceted and deeply entrenched. There are no easy fixes, especially for those
problems which stem from engrained, toxic culture rather than from flawed
policy or law. An important role that prosecutors can and should play in
rebuilding trust between communities and the legal system is, of course, by
prosecuting law enforcement officials when they commit criminal
misconduct and thereby demonstrating that no one, including police officers,
are above the law. In November 2020, my office made history by filing the
first homicide charges brought against a San Francisco police officer for a

164

Of course, there were numerous instances of people who were released committing
new crimes, but those situations were the exception. For example, of the sixty-two sentenced
individuals released prior to their original release date as a result of COVID-19 decarceration
efforts, only six were rebooked prior to their original release date, and only sixteen have been
rebooked into jail total with the most common reason being violation of a court order rather
than a new substantive offense. See Jail Management Data, S.F. SHERIFF’S OFF.,
https://app.powerbigov.us/view?r=eyJrIjoiNmJhNmM4NDYtNWUxZ
i00N2FiLWIxNWItMTA3ZDc
2MzY4OWEyIiwidCI6IjIyZDVjMmNmLWNlM2UtNDQzZC05YTdmLWRmY2MwMjMx
ZjczZiJ9.
165
March and April of 2020 are the two months with the lowest number of arrests
presented to the DA office for possible charging on record while May and June averaged just
lower than the monthly average for 2019. See Clearance Rates Dashboard, S.F. POLICE DEPT.
https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/stay-safe/crime-data/clearance-rates-dashboard
[https://perma.cc/8QSS-YWEE].
166
Michael Barba, SF Speeds Up Jail Closure to Early September, S.F. EXAM’R (Aug. 25,
2020 11:34 AM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/sf-speeds-up-jail-closure-to-earlyseptember/ [https://perma.cc/UFD5-DQRD].
167
Chris Kahn, Exclusive: Most Americans, Including Republicans, Support Sweeping
Democratic Police Reform Proposals – Reuters/Ipsos Poll, REUTERS (June 11, 2020, 3:43
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-poll-exclusive/exclusive-mostamericans-including-republicans-support-sweeping-democratic-police-reform-proposalsreuters-ipsos-poll-idUSKBN23I380 [https://perma.cc/K4AA-VW3Y].
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killing committed while on duty. 168 But while holding law enforcement
officials criminally accountable when they use deadly force in violation of
the law is a key part of obtaining justice for the family of the deceased and
will, hopefully, help to deter future criminal misconduct, post hoc criminal
prosecution does little to fix the numerous underlying problems that lead to
misconduct in the first place. What follows are just a few of the steps SFDAO
has taken to address this longstanding issue. Specifically, this Part examines
policies to: (1) deter police from pretextually stopping and frisking Black and
Brown motorists; (2) ban local law enforcement from hiring officers with a
history of serious misconduct; (3) ensure SFDAO is not complicit in covering
up excessive use of force by police; and (4) avoid relying on the testimony
of individual officers with specific histories of serious misconduct.
A.

PRETEXTUAL STOPS: “DRIVING WHILE BLACK”

Racial profiling undermines law enforcement legitimacy, creates
animus and distrust in communities of color, and decreases public safety. To
ensure the protection of all San Franciscans and to build trust between
communities that have been historically targeted for racially biased law
enforcement, SFDAO discourages “stop and frisk” 169 style policing
strategies.
One such police strategy is that of the pretextual stop: when police
detain a person for a minor offense (i.e. traffic or other infraction) because
the officer seeks to search the person. 170 This practice has become so
commonplace that the term “DWB” or “Driving While Black/Brown” has

168

Paulina Villegas, In a possible first, San Francisco charges an officer with homicide
over fatal on-duty shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2020, 5:12 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/nation/2020/11/24/san-francisco-police-homicide-charge/ [https://perma.cc/XD3DAJUH].
169
A “stop-and-frisk” refers to a brief stop and pat down of a person. The Fourth
Amendment requires that before stopping the person, the police must have a reasonable
suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. If the police reasonably
suspect that the suspect is armed and dangerous, the police may frisk the suspect. The frisk is
also called a “Terry Stop,” after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). However, the New York
City Police department famously and controversially institutionalized a policy of
systematically stopping and frisking young men of color hundreds of thousands of times per
year. See Stop-and-Frisk Data, ACLU OF N.Y., https://www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-Frisk-data
[https://perma.cc/F5GG-PJBP].
170
The use of pretext stops was sanctioned by the Rehnquist Supreme Court in the 1996
Whren decision. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Justice Ginsburg suggested
that it may be appropriate to reevaluate Whren in light of the criticism that the decision
promotes improper police arbitrariness. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
594 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Further, what is permissible is not always good policy.
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become part of the everyday vernacular. 171 Pretextual stops have been
criticized because they give “carte blanche” for police to stop motorists due
to “innumerable traffic laws, many of which are vague and subjective,”172
and are prohibited under the state constitutions of Washington and New
Mexico. 173
California laws make pretextual stops easy for law enforcement officers
to manufacture. The California Vehicle Code contains hundreds of
equipment and moving violations that can result in a stop and citation or
arrest for an infraction. 174 Similarly, there are hundreds of local ordinances
that can form the basis of a citation for an infraction. 175 For these reasons,
law enforcement in San Francisco has almost unfettered discretion to stop an
individual for an infraction when the actual goal is to conduct a subsequent
search.
For almost twenty years, reports have highlighted the gravity of the
problem of racial profiling caused by traffic stops and searches in San
Francisco. 176 The problem has persisted throughout the years and been well-

171

See, e.g., Driving While Black, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Driving_whil
e_black [https://perma.cc/E6ZV-8TK2].
172
Jonathan Blanks, A Pretextual Traffic Stop Should Require Sufficient Pretext, CATO
INST. (Apr. 5, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/pretextual-traffic-stop-shouldrequire-sufficient-pretext [https://perma.cc/95NN-55TL].
173
State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143, 153–55 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d
833, 842 (Wash. 1999). There has been no data to suggest that these jurisdictions have suffered
from greater criminal activity as a result of their added constitutional protections. See also
Megan Quattlebaum, Let’s Get Real: Behavioral Realism, Implicit Bias, and the Reasonable
Police Officer, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV .LIBERTIES 1, 32–33 (2018).
174
The extensive list of statutory moving violations and equipment violations can be
VEHICLE
CODE,
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov
found
at
CAL.
/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=VEH [https://perma.cc/ZRH7-XDSD].
175
San Francisco has numerous and voluminous Municipal Codes that can result in
citations for infractions. The San Francisco Municipal Police Code contains many of these
potential violations and can be found at S.F. POLICE CODE, https://codelibrary.aml
egal.com/codes/san_francisco/latest/sf_police/0-0-0-2 [https://perma.cc/9ZRG-QCDB].
176
See, e.g., MARK SCHLOSBERG, A DEPARTMENT IN DENIAL, THE SAN FRANCISCO POLICE
DEPARTMENT’S FAILURE TO ADDRESS RACIAL PROFILING, ACLU OF NOR. CAL. (2002)
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/A%20Department%20in%20Denial%20%20The%20San%20Francisco%20Police%20Department%27s%20Failure%20t
o%20Address%20Racial%20Profiling.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5TM-48PU] (reporting that
Black motorists were 3.3 times more likely to be stopped by San Francisco police officers in
every police district in the city than whites, while Latinx motorists were 2.6 times more likely
to be stopped; police were more than twice as likely to ask to search Black motorists than
whites and police were significantly less likely to find any evidence of criminality as a result
of searching Black and Latinx individuals).
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documented. 177 Black people in San Francisco, for example, made up over
forty-two percent of all nonconsensual searches following stops, despite
constituting fifteen percent of all stops, and around five percent of
residents. 178 The U.S. Department of Justice did an exhaustive report
documenting similar
phenomena and made several policy
179
recommendations that have still not been fully implemented over four
years later. 180
“Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or
jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is
177
See, e.g., S.F. BLUE RIBBON PANEL, supra note 78 (Analysis of 2015 SFPD traffic stop
data showed that Black and Latinx individuals were more likely to be searched than any other
group following a traffic stop. Of those stopped in 2015, searches were conducted on 1.1
percent of Asian people, 1.7 percent of white people, 5.3 percent of Hispanic people, and 13.3
percent of Black people). See also Community Oriented Policing Serv’s, Collaborative Reform
Initiative, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. (2016), https://cops.usdoj.gov/html/dispatch/11-2016/assess
ment_of_san_francisco_pd.asp [https://perma.cc/Y9CL-UDT7] (finding that Black people
were twenty-four percent more likely to be stopped for a traffic violation than their estimated
population in the driving community and nine percent more likely than their estimated
population among potential traffic; Black and Latinx drivers were disproportionately arrested
and searched following traffic stops and less likely to be found with contraband than white
drivers).
178
Williams, supra, note 76. Similar disparities exist across California. Racial and
Identify Profiling Advisory Board, Annual Report 2020 CAL OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., 36
(2020), https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/ripa-board-report-2020.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/PG58-8DRU].
179
U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., Community Oriented Policing Serv’s, supra note 177.
180
Julian Mark, Amid Calls for Change, San Francisco Police Department Remains Slow
to Reform and, Despite All Data to the Contrary, Continues to Deny Racial Bias, MISSION
LOCAL (June 3, 2020), https://missionlocal.org/2020/06/amid-calls-for-change-san-franciscopolice-department-remains-slow-to-reform-and-despite-all-data-to-the-contrary-continuesto-deny-racial-bias/ [https://perma.cc/AKH7-JJ39]; see also Williams, supra note 76
(reporting that in 2018 Black people were stopped at rates over five times their representation
in the city’s overall population, a greater disparity than Los Angeles, whereas white
individuals were stopped at a lower rate than their representation in the population); Anita
Chabria, Black Drivers Face More Police Stops in California, State Analysis Shows, L.A.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-02/black-driversface-more-police-stops-in-california-new-state-data-show [https://perma.cc/A9MB-UPBP];
KQED Staff & Writers, New State Report Finds Major Racial Disparities in Police Stops
Involving Black People, KQED ONLINE (Jan. 2, 2020 4:20 PM), https://www.kqed.org/n
ews/11793819/new-state-report-finds-major-racial-disparities-in-police-stops-involvingblacks [https://perma.cc/465C-JFCR]; CAL. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., supra note 178
(reporting that in 2018 Black people were stopped at rates over five times their representation
in the city’s overall population, a greater disparity than Los Angeles, whereas white
individuals were stopped at a lower rate than their representation in the population); Darwin
Bond-Graham, Black People in California are stopped far more often by police, major study
proves, GUARDIAN (Jan 3, 2020, 01:00:00 A.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2020/jan/02/california-police-black-stops-force [https://perma.cc/PXJ8-WXGD].
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looking for more.” 181 Thus, the efficacy of this law enforcement tactic is
questionable (state-wide, narcotics were seized in approximately 1.3 percent
of all traffic stops, and weapons or ammunition seized in 0.6 percent of all
traffic stops 182), while the cost to profiled individuals and communities is
great.
This tactic hinders law enforcement’s ability to build necessary trust
with affected communities and hinders the effective prosecution of criminal
cases. For this reason, SFDAO implemented a new policy creating a
presumption against filing possession of contraband crimes when the search
stemmed from an infraction-related stop, and where no other independent
probable cause (such as observed contraband in plain view) or other legal
justification exists to justify the search and seizure of the contraband. 183
B. BAN HIRING POLICE OFFICERS WITH A HISTORY OF SERIOUS
MISCONDUCT

The history of racial bias in law enforcement—combined with police
impunity—undermines public trust, decreases reporting of even violent
crimes, and makes it harder for those police and prosecutors seeking to serve
the public with integrity to do their jobs. Members of the public cannot fully
trust law enforcement officers or feel safe if they are uncertain whether an
officer has a prior history of significant misconduct or abuse.
Yet it is difficult, and in some cases prohibited under California law, for
members of the public to know about prior complaints or findings related to
law enforcement officer misconduct 184 because of California’s “Police
Officer’s Bill of Rights,” and systematic noncompliance with Senate Bill
1421, a law that sought to increase transparency of police records. 185 Even as
181

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). See also
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, DEREK A. EPP, KELSEY SHOUB, SUSPECT CITIZENS (2018)
(analyzing data from 20 million traffic stops in the context of race).
182
CAL. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., supra note 178.
183
MJ Johnson, DA Boudin to Stop Charging for Contraband at Traffic Stops, Gang
Enhancements, S.F. EXAM’R (Feb. 28, 2020, 4:15 PM), https://www.sfexaminer.com/new
s/da-boudin-to-stop-charging-for-contraband-at-traffic-stops-gang-enhancements/
[https://perma.cc/27XG-P5L4].
184
Stephen Stock, Jeremy Carrol, Kevin Nious, & Scott Pham, State Law Hides
Investigations of Police Misconduct from Public Scrutiny, NBC BAY AREA (May 20, 2014,
2:57 PM), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/state-law-hides-investigations-of-policemisconduct-from-public-scrutiny/88099/ [https://perma.cc/36FJ-XCFC].
185
Julian Mark, SB 1421 Madness: S.F. Police Commission Advances Enhanced Police
Misconduct Records Protocol, MISSION LOCAL (Dec. 5, 2019), https://missionlocal.org/2019/
12/sb-1421-madness-s-f-police-commission-passes-tentative-police-misconduct-recordsprotocol/ [https://perma.cc/HS29-SVSD].
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San Francisco’s district attorney, I have no way of knowing how many of our
police officers have histories of serious misconduct or how common it is for
our police department to hire an officer from another jurisdiction with a
history of sustained misconduct allegations, or pending investigations into
misconduct which could not be concluded because the officer left their job. 186
Public trust in San Francisco is badly damaged between law
enforcement agencies and many of the communities they serve, particularly
communities of color. 187 Local governments and taxpayers should hold law
enforcement to the highest standard of professionalism and integrity. To
address these issues and build public trust in the officers who serve as the
public face of law enforcement, SFDAO partnered with Shamann Walton, a
San Francisco County supervisor, to introduce a resolution on June 19, 2020
to prohibit hiring officers from other jurisdictions with prior misconduct
findings for things such as excessive force, racial bias and dishonesty in
reporting or investigating cases. 188 The basic goal of the resolution is to
enhance public trust in law enforcement by ensuring that the people in
uniform, carrying guns and with the power to arrest, do not have a history of
serious misconduct or abuse of authority. The ultimate decision on the hiring
rules will be made by San Francisco’s civil service commission.
The resolution seeks to both prevent San Francisco from serving as a
landing pad for officers with a history of serious misconduct leaving other
jurisdictions, and to close a loophole that allows officers to evade
accountability for serious misconduct: that once an officer has been accused
of misconduct and is aware that an administrative investigation is underway,
rather than comply with the investigation, the officer may quit and look for a
186

SFDAO must rely on the police department for notification whether Brady material
exists in a particular case. Not only can SFDAO not obtain this information in advance of
filing a case, but even after SFDAO obtains the relevant material in one case the office may
not retain it for use in other cases.
187
See Julian Mark, California just passed a sweeping police use-of-force law. San
Francisco is still grappling with police bias., MISSION LOCAL (Aug. 20, 2019),
https://missionlocal.org/2019/08/california-just-passed-a-sweeping-police-use-of-force-lawsan-francisco-is-still-grappling-with-police-bias/ [https://perma.cc/E7CN-ZYM8]; Rich
Morin & Renee Stepler, The Racial Confidence Gap in Police Performance, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Sep. 29, 2016), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2016/09/29/the-racial-confidence-gap-inpolice-performance/ [https://perma.cc/K5LC-ACF9].
188
Memorandum from the Public Safety and Neighborhood Services Committee, S.F. BD.
OF SUPERVISORS, 46-200592, at 3 (June 23, 2020) https://sfgov.legistar.com/View.as
hx?M=F&ID=8627313&GUID=05871D32-4779-4233-A2F4-D83BBCFBB837 [https://per
ma.cc/T5KD-ZHXF]; Error! Hyperlink reference not valid.Nicholas Iovino, San Francisco
Looks to Ban Hiring of Cops With Histories of Misconduct, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (June
2, 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/san-francisco-looks-to-ban-hiring-of-cops-withhistories-of-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/3H8P-Q447].
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job in another police department. Without the participation of the accused or
the ability to impose any administrative sanctions, most departments simply
terminate the investigations without a final determination. The resolution
would close that loophole by treating any investigation which was not
completed due to the departure and non-cooperation of the officer as having
resulted in a sustained finding.
All San Franciscans deserve to feel safe when interacting with police
and should be able to trust that the officers tasked with protecting them have
no prior history of excessive force, racial bias, or other significant
misconduct. This policy is a critical step in that direction.
C. BODY WORN CAMERA VIDEO REVIEW

One particular and uniquely challenging form of police misconduct
involves the fabrication of 189 resisting arrest 190 or assault-on-an-officer
charges 191 against people the officers simply do not like or, worse, as a means
to cover up 192 their own excessive force. 193 As one article explained, “[p]olice
officers will also invent cover charges when a suspect is injured during
apprehension or while in custody. In order for the officer to defend against a
potential claim of excessive force, he will attest that the injuries were a result
of the defendant’s assault on the officer or on the defendant’s having resisted
apprehension.” 194 Anyone who has practiced criminal law knows this is a
common enough problem but is one that evades easy statistical measure.
Even the perception of this problem would undermine trust in police and
suggest prosecutor complicity in police misconduct.
Traditionally prosecutors reviewing cases where police present these
sorts of charges have had little choice but to accept the written police report
189
NJ Officer Pleads Guilty to Using Excessive Force, Filing False Police Report to
Cover Up Taking Cash From Drivers, NBC N.Y. (Sep. 9, 2019, 5:25 PM), https://www.nbc
newyork.com/news/local/nj-officer-pleads-guilty-to-using-excessive-force-filing-falsepolice-report-to-cover-up-taking-cash-from-drivers/1990816/ [https://perma.cc/P2ES-7V7Z].
190
CAL. PENAL CODE § 148 (West 2016).
191
Id. §§ 69, 243(c), among others.
192
Alex Emslie, S.F. Officer’s Testimony Allowed to Stand -- Despite Episode of
Misconduct, Dishonesty, KQED (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11656894/s-fofficers-testimony-allowed-to-stand-despite-episode-of-misconduct-dishonesty
[https://perma.cc/WW8G-UG7E].
193
Sukey Lewis, Nadine Sebai, Alex Emslie & Thomas Peele, Excessive Force, False
Reports Detailed in Rio Vista Police Misconduct Files, KQED (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.
kqed.org/news/11721801/bad-arrests-excessive-force-and-false-reports-detailed-in-releaseof-rio-vista-police-misconduct-files [https://perma.cc/2LKB-3UUE].
194
David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L.
455, 476 (1999).
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at face value. Now, since 2018, most San Francisco police officers have been
required to wear Body Worn Cameras (“BWC”). 195 On June 5, 2020, 196
SFDAO implemented a new policy requiring review of BWC or other
available independent evidence—such as video surveillance footage—prior
to filing charges such as resisting arrest or assault on an office. The office no
longer risks either being complicit in covering up police misconduct or
erroneously discharging a case where an officer was actually assaulted.
This simple policy change, requiring that prosecutors review the
available objective evidence, represents a significant step towards ensuring
that SFDAO can uphold the law and protect police officers who are assaulted
during the course of their duties while simultaneously avoiding being
complicit in prosecuting victims of police violence.
D. DO NOT RELY LIST

The interdependence of police and prosecutors 197 as well as the problem
stemming from that interdependence have been well documented. 198 Thanks
to the efforts of police unions 199 and law enforcement officers’ bills of rights,
it is often difficult to remove even repeat offenders from the ranks of a police
department. 200 The integrity of particular criminal convictions, and the
system writ large, are undermined when prosecutors rely on the reports and
testimony of a specific officer with a documented history of dishonesty,
racial profiling, excessive force, or other serious misconduct.

195

William Scott, Department Bulletin, Activation of Body Worn Cameras, S.F.P.D.
(2018), https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/18-256.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/PG9K-4ABR].
196
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Appointment and New Policy Designed to Protect the Public from Police Misconduct and
Abuse (June 5, 2020), https://sfdistrictattorney.org/press-release/new-appoint-and-policy-toprotect-public-from-police-misconduct-and-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/APA2-3D8P].
197
See, e.g., Olwyn Conway, How Can I Reconcile With You When You Have Your Foot
on My Neck? The Role of Justice in the Pursuit of Truth and Reconciliation, 2018 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1349, 1377 (2018) (“This dependency dramatically decreases the degree to which
prosecutors are willing to reject officer testimony, pursue misconduct claims against officers,
or challenge police narratives.”).
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895 (2020) (examining how prosecutors enable police misconduct on an institutional level).
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COLUM. L. REV. 1333 (2020).
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Rights” Enable Police Violence and Prevent Accountability, 52 U.S.F. L. REV. 275 (2018).
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Of course, not all people who lie once or twice can never be trusted
again, and arguably most people lie on a regular basis. 201 Yet law
enforcement officers have a unique power and their misconduct “unilaterally
reduces the protections of the Constitution.” 202 And when specific law
enforcement officers commit serious misconduct in the course of their duty
it casts a shadow of doubt on the integrity of their future investigations and
testimony.
Accordingly, on June 15, 2020 SFDAO announced a new policy 203 to
no longer charge cases that rely solely on uncorroborated reports from
officers with prior serious misconduct. This policy—not to seek convictions
on the word of individual officers whose testimony there is specific reason
to doubt—is intended to accomplish three related goals. First, it will prevent
wrongful convictions in the future. Second, it will deter future misconduct
by law enforcement. And third, the policy will build public trust and restore
integrity to the criminal justice system. Although this policy is not enough to
entirely cure the conflict 204 of interest created by the interdependence of
police and prosecutors, nor is it enough to root out the scourge of police
misconduct or “testilying,” 205 it is an essential step.
CONCLUSION
These are challenging times, unparalleled in American history. Yet this
moment, like every moment of crisis, brings opportunities. The COVID-19
pandemic and the surge of the Black Lives Matter movement in the wake of
George Floyd’s murder accelerated many of the precise changes that, as a
candidate, I promised to work toward. To be sure, there is much work yet to
201
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(2002), https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2002-06/uoma-urf061002.php [https://perm
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202
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1, 16 (2010)
203
Matt Kawahara, Boudin Bans Prosecutions Based on Sole Testimony of Untrustworthy
Police Officers, S.F. CHRON. (2020), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Boudinbans-prosecutions-based-on-sole-testimony-15342242.php [https://perma.cc/R2FV-KCCE].
204
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See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, The Police: Testilying: Police Perjury and What to do
About it, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996) (“[L]ying intended to convict the guilty—in
particular, lying to evade the consequences of the exclusionary rule—is so common and so
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be done and none of the policies described supra will be a complete solution
to the problems they seek to address. My hope is that the whole is more than
the sum of its parts: the changes underway in SFDAO in 2020 are aimed not
just at addressing narrow lacunas in existing policy but rather at
revisioning the role of the district attorney altogether. The role of a district
attorney should be understood as a community-engaged stakeholder in
building broad-based public safety.
SFDAO’s work is far from over; we will continue to measure and
improve existing policies as well as to implement new ones as transparently
and
efficiently
as
can
be
done
safely.
Truly
addressing the societal issues that drive crime cannot be done through narrow
reforms that ignore broader contexts. Promoting public safety means
considering public health, education, employment, housing, the environment
and more. After all, healthy, equitable communities are safe communities.
SFDAO will continue to innovate ways to make San Francisco healthy and
equitable for all of its residents, and to encourage other jurisdictions to act
more boldly to implement change and to find opportunities in what may at
first appear to be obstacles.
When it comes to criminal justice policy there is no shortage of grave,
complex, and well-documented problems. Each of those problems presents
an opportunity for innovation and for reimagining the role of the prosecutor.
I embrace the possibilities.

